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VALUATION IN RATE CASES
VALUATION IN RATE CASES
By HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER*
T is a legal commonplace that rates prescribed by public authority
must, ordinarily, permit a fair return to be earned on the fair
value of the property devoted to the public use if these are suc-
cessfully to leap the constitutional barriers protecting private prop-
erty. Three decades of litigation might reasonably be expected
to have sufficiently definitized the vague generality of the preced-
ing statement to forestall such extreme discrepancies between the
value judgments of opposing experts as many present day cases
reveal. It has recently been said:
"That there is in such figures small security against confisca-
tory rates, little protection to the public against unfair charges for
public service, and but meager ground for hope that the values of
utility securities can be stabilized or that confidence in the gov-
ernmental function of rate making can be established, until some
more certain method is found for arriving at rate base values."1
The most forcible statement of judicial discontent with the
present state of the law of the constitutional measure of the rate
base is that of Mr. justice Brandeis in the Southwestern Bell
Telephone Case.2 That opinion is frankly an argument for aban-
doning the attempt to work out an intelligible rate base theory in
terms of value and to substitute therefor prudent investment.
Such a shift will involve fundamental changes not only in the tech-
nique of applying the confiscation rule but also in the character of
that rule itself. The issue between these competing rate base
theories constitutes the crucial problem in the public utility field
today. It would be somewhat rash to venture a present prediction
as to the ultimate fate of the prudent investment theory. It may
well turn on the answer to the more important question whether
it should prevail. It is the latter that will be principally considered
in the following discussion.
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, (1924) 300
Fed. 190.
'State of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commission of Missouri, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 67 L. Ed. 981, 43
S. C. R. 544.
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A brief resum6 of the historical development of the problem
of rate regulation will give the necessary background for evaluat-
ing the competing rate base theories. The era that began with
Munn v. Illinois3 has been marked by a considerable legislative
extension of the field of public callings, an intensification of their
control, and the creation of a great body of administrative machin-
ery for effecting it.4 Each of these movements has involved limi-
tations on individual freedom and interferences with habits of
action so long established as to have acquired the character of
vested interests. Authoritative price regulation was but a single
phase of a broader conflict between groups for very concrete eco-
nomic advantages.5 The state stepped in to effect a particular dis-
tribution of wealth. Its power to intervene at all was sustained
against objections based on various constitutional guaranties, 6 as
was its power to do so through administrative boards. 7 The issue
next contested involved the question where final authority rested to
determine the validity of rates fixed by public authority. The
Supreme Court's original position, taken at a time when the prob-
lem of the confiscatory character of rates had not been clearly dif-
ferentiated from the more general one of their reasonableness,
vested it in the legislature. 8 This was followed by an intimation
evidencing a trend toward subjecting their reasonableness to judi-
cial review,9 while shortly thereafter appeared a distinct state-
ment that the power to regulate was not unlimited.'0 The theory
that due process required an opportunity for judicial review was
definitely established in 1889,"" and remains today more strongly
'(1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
4For cases illustrating extension of the field, see Budd v. New York,(1892) 143 U. S. 517,36 L. Ed. 247, 12 S. C. R. 468; Brass v. North Dakota,
(1894) 153 U. S. 391, 38 L. Ed. 757, 14 S. C. R. 857. German Alliance
Insurance Co. v. Lewis, (1914) 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. Ed. 1011, 34 S. C. R
612;'Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, (1921) 256 U. S. 170, 65 L.
Ed. 877, 41 S. C. R. 465. For cases illustrating various phases of intensi-
fication, see Akron, C. & Y. R. Co. v. United States, (1923) 261 U. S. 184,
67 L. Ed. 605, 43 S. C. R. 270; Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United
States, (1924) 263 U. S. 456; 68 L. Ed. 216 (Adv, 0.), 44 Sup. Ct. 169."
'See 3 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 296-318.
'Munn v. Illinois, (1876) 94 U. S. 113 24 L. Ed. 77.
"Railroad Commission Cases, (1886) 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. Ed. 636,
6 S. C. R. 191, 334, 388.
'Munn v. Illinois, (1886) 94 U. S. 113, 135, 24 L. Ed. 77, 87.
'Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, (1884) 110 U. S. 347, 354,
28 L. Ed. 173, 176, 4 S. C. R. 48.
1 Railroad Commission Cases, (1886) 116 U. S. 307, 331, 29 L. Ed. 636,
644, 6 S. C. R. 191, 334, 388.
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intrenched than ever.' 2 Its development was not so much a logical
deduction from e, isting legal premises as an almost unconscious
adjustment of legal views under the pressure of a felt necessity to
protect what were deemed vital interests of liberty and property
against attacks not always well considered.13
The adoption of the theory of judicial review imposed on
courts the burdensome task of evolving principles defining the
limits of permissible regulation. The early tendency was to con-
ceive the problem in terms of eminent domain, 14 although there
were occasional suggestions of an approach based on a contract
theory. 5 Neither is today an effective factor except in so far as
stating the problem in terms of value may be considered a vestigial
trace of the former. It has long been recognized that the prob-
lem presents a particular instance of determining the constitutional
limits of the police power. An exercise of that power is valid if
reasonable, and the factors on which that judgment depends will
vary with the kind of question involved. It was sensed from the
very beginning that the legality of authoritatively prescribed rates
was in some manner dependent on their permitting some return."
The relevancy of their effect upon income available for interest
and dividends was both asserted17 and doubted." The measure-
'Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minn., (1890) 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. Ed.
970, 10 S. C. R. 462, 702.
"Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, (1920) 253 U. S. 287,
64 L. Ed. 908, 40 S. C. R. 527.
"Evidence of the existence of such fears during the period prior to
and immediately following the establishment of the doctrine of judicial
review is to be found in briefs of counsel for the companies in the Spring
Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, (1884) 110 U. S. 347, 354, 28 L. Ed. 173,
176, 4 S. C. R. 48 and C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minn., (1890) 134 U. S.
418, 33 L. Ed*970, 10 S. C. R. 462, 702; in an address of Justice Brewer
reported in Vol. 16 of the Reports of the New York State Bar Associa-
tion; and in an article by W. F. Dana in 9 Harv. L. Rev. 324.
4Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., (1894) 154 U. S. 362, 410, 38
L. Ed. 1014, 1027, 14 S. C. R. 1047; Ames v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., (1894)
64 Fed. 165, 176, 68 S. C. R. 728; San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego,(1897) 118 Cal. 556, 567, 50 Pac. 633.
"See for discussion of development of these various approaches G. C.
Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 902, 1031.
A trace of the contract theory is found in Justice Brandeis' opinion in the
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. case, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 290, 67 L. Ed.
981, 986, 43 S. C. R. 544, 547.
"The bill of complaint in Peck v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (1876)
94 U. S. 164, 24 L. Ed. 97, contained an allegation that the rates in effect
before their reduction by regulation did not produce sufficient income to
pay interest on the road's debt at the legal rate.
'Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, (1888) 35 Fed. 866, 879.
"
8St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gill, (1895) 156 U. S. 649, 657, 39 L. Ed.
567, 570, 15 S. C. R. 484.
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ment of the rate base by market value, 19 capitalization, 20 invest-
ment, 21 and present cost,2 2 had been either suggested or adopted
in cases prior to Smyth v. Anes.2  These confused gropings to-
ward definition in the vague due-process standard received a meas-
urable synthesis in the famous dictum in the Smyth Case that
"what the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value
of that which it employs for the public convenience. -" 24  This had
at least the merit of stating the problem with greater definiteness
than had been theretofore attained. The Court, however, essayed
an answer to at least a part of the problem in the familiat rule that:
"In order to ascertain that value, the original cost of con-
struction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the
amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as
compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earn-
ing capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by
statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all
matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may
be just and right in each case."
The possibility of omitted factors was expressly conceded.
This eclectic formula, though a mere summation of every theory
that had been theretofore advanced, has exerted, and still exerts,
an influence far beyond its merits 23 It has been the starting point
of practically every discussion of valuation by courts in subsequent
rate cases, and it is only within the last few years that its claims
have been vigorously challenged.2 6 It has become quite the fashion
to condemn it with unsparing criticism, much of it justifiable
even if at times couched in the intemperate language of violent
partisanship.2  Its critics should at least recognize its right to be
"Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1894) 154 U.jS. 362, 410, 38
L. Ed. 1014, 1027, 14 S. C. R. 1047.
"Ames v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., (1894) 64 Fed. 165, 177.
'Brymer v. Butler Water Co., (1897) 179 Pa. St. 231, 250, 36 Atd. 249.
See also language in Dow v. Beidelman, (1888) 125 U. S. 680, 690, 31 L. Ed.
841, 844, 8 S. C. R. 1028.
'Capital City Gas Light Co. v. Des Moines, (1896) 72 Fed. 829.
"(1898) 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ET. 819, 18 S. C. R. 418.
2(1898) 169 U. S. 466, 546, 42 L. Ed. 819, 849, 18 S. C. R. 418.
"For an excellent and accurate statement of its transformation and
present position, see E. C. Goddard, Fair Value of Public Utilities, 22
Mich. L. Rev. 652, 777.
'R. H. Whitten, Fair Value for Rate Purposes, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 419;
Donald R. Richberg, A Permanent Basis for Rate Regulation, 31 Y. L.
Journ. 263; Robt. L. Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases,
30 Yale L. J. 710; G. C. Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts,
33 Harv. L. Rev. 902, 1031; E. C. Goddard, Fair Value of Public Utilities,
22 Mich. L. Rev. 652, 777.
'Richberg, The Supreme Court Discusses Value, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 289.
VALUATION IN RATE CASES
judged in part in the light of the development the problem had
reached when the Sinth Case was decided.
The rule states a value theory of the rate base, and enumerates
evidentiary facts relevant in its ascertainment. It is not the pur-
pose of the present discussion to trace the process which has prac-
tically eliminated the consideration of every factor but actual cost
and cost-new.28 The present state of the law requires depreciated
reproduction cost to be considered, 29 but it is not necessarily the
equivalent of the protected value.2 0 The cases since Smyth v.
Aines have developed a considerable body of rules dealing with
the elements to be included in a valuation 31 and the unit property
to be considered in their application,32 but the fundamental ap-
proach has remained practically unchanged throughout. The prac-
tice of commissions and courts has lacked exactness proportioned
almost directly to the opportunity therefor afforded by the catch-
all character of their working formula, 33 although the former have
been kept from adopting an investment theory principally by the
fear of having their results disallowed by courts.34 The actual
figures arrived at usually represent compromises, and the courts
have not yet evolved the principles that circumscribe the area of
legitimate compromise. It was stated in the Minnesota Rate
Case.03 that:
"The ascertainment of value is not controlled by artificial
rules. It is not a matter of formulas, but there must be a reason-
able judgment having its basis in a proper consideration of all the
relevant facts."
It is a perfectly apt characterization of the existing judicial
attitude, and little progress has been made in definitizing the tests
that determine the reasonableness of that judgment. Three decades
'See E. C. Goddard. op. cit.
'Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. P. S. C. of Mo., (1923) 262 U. S. 276,
67 L. Ed. 981, 43 S. C. R. 544.
"Ga. Ry. & Power Co. v. R. R. Comm., (1923) 262 U. S. 625, 67 L. Ed.
728, 43 S. C. R. 680.
'The cases dealing with this and other valuation problems are classi-
fied and analyzed in Whitten, Valuation of Public Service Corporations,
Vols. I and II.
"Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. W. Va. (1914) 236 U. S. 605, 59 L. Ed.
745, 35 S. C. R. 437; Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, (1914) 236 U. S.
585, 59 L. Ed. 735, 35 S. C. R. 429; Vandalia R. Co. v. Schnull, (1921) 255
U. S. 113, 65 L. Ed. 539, 41 S. C. R. 324.
'For an analysis of the actual practices of commissions in 363 cases
during the years 1920-23, see footnote 14 to the opinion of Justice Brandeis
in S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. P. S. C. of Missouri, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 67
L. Ed. 981, 43 S. C. R. 544.
'See E. C. Goddard. op. cit., at pp. 669 ff.; 19 Mich. L. Rev. 849.
"(1912) 230 U. S. 352, 434, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 S. C. R. 729.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of rate litigation on the basis of Smyth v. Ames has given
us Sntyth v. Ames relieved of some of its patent errors and imper-
fections, but its eclecticism still generally accepted though the
limits of choice have been somewhat circumscribed. There are
insistent demands for discarding it which are justified in so far
as they have reference to the habit of considering its formula as
an answer to the problem it dealt with. 36 The spell it has cast
over. legal thinking will have to be exorcised if the re-examination
of the entire question now in process is to advance beyond the
academic stage, but it would be fatuous to identify that with a rea-
sonable solution of the problem. The soundness of the prudent
investment theory is not established by demonstrating the insuf-
ficiency of Snyth v. Ames and the modified doctrines derived from
it, and the inadequacy of judicial reasoning in their support.
It would be futile to hope for its adoption for such reasons even
if the method were logically correct. Prudent investment will have
to justify itself by proof of its own merits. The situation invites
a reconsideration of the entire problem.
The principle of authoritative price control has been most fre-
quently applied to services requiring for their production a consid-
erable capital outlay, although occasionally resorted to where the
services were primarily personal in character.3 7 It has been essen-
tially a limitation of the right of property and the entrepreneur's
liberty of action, and the incidence of its effects has been on the
classes owning selected types of capital goods. 3  The factor that
makes their ownership desirable is the opportunity it affords for
securing an income. The economic significance of such goods con-
sists in the fact that their technological position in the processes
of production makes their employment therein practically indis-
pensable, and, since their supply is not unlimited, their contribu-
tion thereto will have to be recognized in any rationally conducted
system. It is, however, the legal institutions of private property
and contract that enable their owners to demand and secure a price
for that contribution. The very existence of the law of property
and of contract involve a measure of authoritative interposition
'
6See articles cited in footnotes 26 and 27, and opinion of Justice Bran-
deis in the S. W. Bell Tel. Co. case, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 290, 67 L. Ed.
981, 986, 43 S. C. R. 544, 547.
'Wilson v. New, (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 61 L. Ed. 755, 37 S. C. R. 298;
People v. Weller (1924) 237 N. Y. 316, 143 N. E. 205; In re Opinion of the
Justices, (Mass. 1924) 143 N. E. 808.
'The terms "capital goods" or "capital" are used to obviate the legal
connotations inevitably associated with the term "property."
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in the economic order that is frequently obscured because a familiar
part of an accepted regime. The individualism that has helped
to mold our law has had its counterpart in a laissez-faire economics.
The same assumptions underlay both the legal and economic orders.
The right of property conferred upon an owner the power to
determine who should enjoy the services derivable from capital
goods and the terms upon which they might be secured, except in
a relatively small field. It was the existence of these powers that
made the institution of private property an effective factor in the
distribution of wealth, since they included the specific power to
fix prices and distribution is effected through the mechanism of
price. The material content of the right of property consists in
certain rights, powers and privileges exercisable by the owner that
have undergone considerable modifications and are likely to un-
dergo many more. The general modern trend is to reduce their
number. Every such reduction constitutes a taking of property
in the factual sense. If it bears upon those objects of property
that have been hereinbef ore designated as capital goods, it is almost
certain to affect the position of their owners in the economic strug-
gle. Not all such rights, powers and privileges have an equal
economic significance. The particular powers referred to above
are unquestionably the most important from this point of view.
The imposition of the duty to serve all on reasonable demand, and
authoritative price fixing and price limitation, therefore, constitute
modifications of the right of property of peculiar importance that
affect its very essence when its function in a capitalistic economic
order based on individual initiative is considered. The difference
between them and other forms of regulation are matters of degree
only, but of such importance in dealing with a question that in-
volves primarily the adjustment of conflicting economic interests
that the problem raised thereby may be said to be sui generis. It
is probably inaccurate to say. that there has evolved a changed
concept of property since that concept has never possessed uni-
formity nor lacked the quality of modifiability. 39 The significant
thing is that property in capital goods has been classified on the
basis of the industry in which it is employed, and shorn of certain
economically significant powers if engaged in so-called public
services. Prices fixed by public authority have supplanted those
determined by a market in establishing the distributive share of
'See Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property
Concept, 22 Col. L. Rev. 209.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
capital embarked in utility enterprises. The decisions holding that
the legislative power to fix rates is a limited one in effect declare
that the due process clause recognizes and protects that economic
function of property in capital goods. The doctrine of judicial
review has forced the courts to evolve a legal theory of distribu-
tion whose development can be traced in the long line of rate cases.
The presently competing rate base theories can best be evaluated if
rate regulation be considered from that point of view.
The phrase "distribution of wealth" may refer either to the
division of their jbint product among the factors of production,
or its division among the social groups controlling those factors.
The former is ordinarily considered an economic problem; the lat-
ter is too much affected at innumerable points by legal institutional
factors to be so narrowly conceived. The economist's task is to
analyze the forces that operate in a given situation to determine
the former, and in doing so he invariably makes certain assump-
tions that condition their operation. An economic order based on
individual initiative and free competition is the chief of these
assumptions. The state's primary concern is with the latter prob-
lem. Our legal order is in general committed to the same assump-
tions made by the economist. It cannot, however, overlook the
practical fact that the actual distribution that occurs when economic
forces are allowed full scope is determined by the concurrently
existing distribution of economic power in the form of legally rec-
ognized claims and powers based on ownership of property. It
frequently exercises its taxing powers to secure a final distribution
of the social product other than would have resulted from unregu-
lated economic action by exercising the control over economic
forces secured through the wealth obtained from taxes to direct it
into channels where it would not otherwise have gone. Nor can. it
blind itself to frequent and important failures of the facts to con-
form to its general assumptions. This sometimes induces legis-
lative efforts to enforce conformity, as witness the anti-trust laws,
and at other times measures aimed at securing those social benefits
which it is conceived would result if its assumptions were actually
realized. Interferences of the kind first mentioned imply a partial
denial of the general soundness of the theory of a natural harmony
between individual and social welfare; those of the'latter type
involve an assumption that the general welfare demands no more
than what free competition would* give. Price regulation has in
general aimed to secure only the latter,40 and has been most fre-
VALUATION IN RATE CASES
quently invoked where an element of monopoly has been present.
An analysis of the rate cases will show that the courts have been
in part influenced by the desire to insure owners of public utilities
an opportunity to secure that income which they would have tended
to receive had the industries been actually competitive. 41 It
is doubtful whether any considerable modification of that approach
can be expected, and apparently none is suggested by advocates of
prudent investment except in so far as that theory is supported
on a contract theory.4 - The succeeding discussion will tentatively
assume its validity, and consider the factors that would determine
that income under competitive conditions.
It may be safely premised that the income accruing to capital
depends on the value of its products as fixed by the market. The
ideal market posited by competitive economics assumes free com-
petition among sellers and among buyers. The capital fund at any
given time consists of an indefinite number of concrete capital
goods adapted to the production of particular goods or services.
As long as the capital goods required for the production of any
given commodity or service are reproducible, the price of the lat-
ter tend toward cost, including a capital return itself determined in
the capital market. If those capital goods are reproducible only
at an increasing or increased cost, a .differential income accrues
to the less costly capital, which becomes a negative differential if
it is reproducible at decreasing or decreased cost or if technical
improvements reduce the capital required for each unit of product.
If, however, the capital fund is invested in goods that cannot be
reproduced,43 the price of the product has no necessary tendency
toward cost even under conditions of competition, and a so-called
unearned increment results. It is apparent, therefore, that the
income on capital devoted to the production of any commodity or
service tends under competition to be determined by the capital
cost that has to be incurred to reproduce the commodity or service
at the time in question. The fact that the capital fund is not an
abstract substance of freely interchangeable units, but embodied in
concrete capital goods adapted to very special technical processes,
destroys any equivalence between that .capital cost and return on
'The emphasis on monopolistic conditions as justifying price control
points in that direction. The statement would probably be inaccurate in
the case of usury laws and the extensive price regulation during the
late war.1See Steenerson v. G. N. Ry. Co., (1897) 69 Minn. 353, 72 N. W. 713.
"
2See articles by R. H. Whitten and Donald R. Richberg referred to in
footnotes 26 and 27.
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investment except during periods of stable prices and static tech-
nical conditions. It follows that the capital base tends to be the
outlay required to supply the capital goods necessary to reproduce
the commodity or service. This analysis is valid whether the indus-
try is expanding or merely stationary for in the latter capital
replacements are continually required; it is inapplicable only during
the period that an overexpanded industry is adjusting itself to
eliminate that condition. If, then, the purpose of regulation is to
secure for the public the prices it would have to pay if the indus-
tries were competitive, the rate base indicated by the logic of eco-
nomic analysis. except where the industry is overexpanded, is the
cost of furnishing the capital required to produce the service at
any given period, which is, as applied to capital embarked in the
industry at earlier periods, equivalent to investment only on the
assumption of static price and technical conditions during the
larger period including both those just referred to. This view has
received no judicial recognition, although the theory that the rate
base should be determined by the cost of reproducing an equally
efficient plant as that being valued, which approaches nearest it,
has been discussed in several cases. 44
The views above,advanced indicate a result that bears super-
ficial resemblance to the cost of reproduction theory. There is,
however, one significant difference. Cost of reproduction is usu-
ally applied to the actual plant rendering the service. 45  This
operates pro tanto to deprive the public of the benefits of increased
technical efficiency, and that is certain to represent a dead loss to
the public in an era of progressive technical improvements and
advances. This burden will not be present in every case where
the actual plant antedates the time of the investigation, but only
in those where an unprogressive technical policy has been pursued.
There is a strong probability that it will to some extent exist in
every case. The rate base suggested in the preceding paragraph.
relieves the public of this burden, which it would not have to bear
under conditions of competition.
'For purposes of simplifying the discussion, the distinction made by
economists between capital and land is disregarded.
'Capital Gas Light Co. v. Des Moines, (1896) 72 Fed. 829, 844; Spring
Valley Water Co. v. San Francisco, (1908) 1B5 Fed. 667, 691; idem, (1911)
192 Fed. 137, 153; Murray v. Pub. Ut. Comm., (1915) 27 Idaho 603, 150
Pac. 47. See also S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. P. S; C. of Mo., (1923) 262
U. S. 276, 67 L. Ed. 981, 43 S. C. R. 544. See R. H. Whitten, Fair Value
for Rate Purposes, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 419.
'Smyth v. Ames, (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. Ed. 819, 18 S. C. R. 418;
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The discussion thus far has not stressed the fact that competi-
tion requires time to effect its results. The result of that factor
is that the actual capital cost element of prices at any given time
will not be that which would have to be incurred to reproduce the
product or service at that time, but rather that which was incurred
at some prior period. There exists, therefore, the possibility that
the public would have to pay prices during the interval in excess of
those indicated by the suggested standard. It is a fair question
whether that standard should be modified to reflect that factor.
The issue is whether the economic rate base shall be determined
on the assumption of ideal or actual conditions of competition.
The latter course would attach too great a significance to the par-
ticular moment at which a rate question arose. The former affords
a more effective technique for arriving at a judgment based on
the more important permanent forces' that determine prices in
a competitive economic order characterized by a condition of per-
petual flux, and is for that reason preferable. The suggested
theory, therefore, requires no modification to reflect the time fac-
tor that prevents the actual economic situation at any given time
from corresponding exactly to that which ideal conditions of com-
petition would create.
The concrete issues in rate cases involve more than conflicting
rate base theories. The rate base must be expressed in monetary
terms, and that raises difficult price questions that can be avoided
only by adopting the prudent investment theory. A public utility
plant is an aggregate of specific items of property technically com-
bined into a functional unit that furnishes the service. There is
ordinarily no market of sufficient breadth in which such units are
bought and sold to perform the task of definitizing and translating
the effects of the significant economic forces into terms of prices.
This circumstance forces resort to indirect methods. Those that
suggest themselves most readily are the determination of the aggre-
gate prices of the stocks and bonds outstanding against the enter-
prise, the ascertainment of the balance sheet figures, and appraisal.
The first two can be employed to secure a price expression based
on the rate base theory heretofore suggested only if the service
whose rates are in question is being rendered by a plant in all tech-
nical respects identical with one that would be then constructed to
render the same service, and if there has been in no respect any
S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. P. S. C. of Mo., (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 67 L. Ed., 981,
43 S. C. R. 544.
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change in the money outlay required to construct it. The im-
probability of such a concurrence of conditions renders them im-
possible for any practical purposes. The first would, moreover,
have to be rejected in applying that rate base theory for the same
reasons that have caused its practical elimination in applying the
"fair value" rule.4 6 An appraisal fuinishes the only practical
method, even as it constitutes today the most common method
employed to get a price figure under the cost of reproduction
theory.
Every attempt to translate into a definite money figure any
rate base, other tlan one based on the investment in the particular
plant whose rates are in question, requires a judgment as to what
prices shall be taken. This demands, whenever the method in-
volves an appraisal, a great mass of particular judgments on the
prices of the innumerable specific items that go to make up the
plant. The orthodox cost of reproduction theory still stresses the
prices prevailing at the date of the inquiry which, however, not
infrequently extends over a considerable period during which price
levels are not always stationary. A constant readjustment of
prices to reflect fluctuations occurring during that period would
reduce the whole process to an absurdity, and its development to
its full logical extent would require the constant and almost per-
petual supervision of courts to prevent confiscation in times of
rising price levels. Rate regulation would become a practical im-
possibility as long as the practice of judicial review was retained.
The situation demands not only that rates be prescribed for longer
periods than a day, but also that the judicial determination of their
validity shall fix the status to be maintained for a considerable
period. A more rational theory of the effective prices for a rate
base appraisal is, therefore, required. That is sometimes attempted
by taking prices as of a given date, at others average prices for an
assumed period, and at times prices which an analysis of price
trends is deemed to indicate as those according with the current
normal price levelor that of the immediate future in which the
rates are to be in effect.4 7 The prices indicated are taken on the
"See Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., (1897) 82 Fed. 850;
C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, (1898) 90 Fed. 363; Knoxville v.
Knoxville Water Co., (1909) 212 U. S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 371, 29 S. C. R. 148;
T. & R. R. Co. v. R. R. Comm. of La., (1911) 192 Fed. 280, 112 C. C. A.
538; M. Wy. & So. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of R. R. Comm. of Mont., (1912) 198
Fed. 991.
'See footnote 6 to Justice Brandeis' opinion in S. W. Bell Tel. Co.
case, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 290, 67 L. Ed.. 981, 986, 43 S. C. R. 544, 547;
William G. Raymond, Engineer's Method of Inventorying and Valuing
-Public Utility Properties, 9 Ia. L. Bull. 36.
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theory that they fairly represent the general condition of affairs
that will exist during the period the rates are to be in force. The
benefits and burdens that result from minor price fluctuations or
movements during that period are thereby necessarily secured or
borne by the industry. Constitutional principles cannot be con-
strued with such meticulous refinement as to avoid that result.
The first two methods are mere compromises with nothing to rec-
ommend them except that they furnish standards relatively easy
to obtain; they are bound to produce discrepancies between their
theory and the facts unless the price level is static. The last is
the only method even measurably adapted to reduce those dis-
crepancies to a minimum during a time of changing price levels,
since it does aim to give a quantitative expression to a prediction
as to those changes based on an elaborate statistical analysis. There
is nothing in the current reproduction cost theory that furnishes
a basis for making a choice between them. although post-war infla-
tion and the more recent partial deflation have raised the problem
in an acute form. The nature of the problem is such that opinion
and prediction cannot be eliminated. Each method involves them.
The most reasonable course is to select the method that takes into
account the greatest number of factors operating in the situation.
That is clearly the last, for it omits no factors considered by the
others and evaluates the most significant one as well. Its only
drawback in comparison with the others is that this very effort to
take into account the price trend affords an additional opportunity
for guess-work. The analysis of price movements is not yet an
exact science, but sufficient data exist to form at least an intelli-
gent basis for their prediction with as reasonable a degree of accu-
racy as is customary in human affairs. The suggested draw-back
is not, therefore, sufficient to affect the relative theoretical superi-
ority of this method. These same price problems exist if the cost
of reproducing the service is taken as the rate base, and the con-
clusion just stated holds where its application is involved. It is
in fact implicit in the approach adopted that the public secures
economic justice if public service industries are limited to an oppor-
tunity to obtain that income which they would obtain if competi-
tive. Effective competition will appear, even where conditions of
competition are completely free, only if the capital cost that must
be incurred to create the plant for furnishing the service is deemed
fairly representative of cost conditions likely to prevail for a future
period whose duration cannot, of course, be exactly defined.
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This is sufficiently patent where the price trend is downward and
where, though upward, it is marked by considerable instability. It
is true, though to a lesser extent, where it is definitely believed to
be upward for a considerable future period. The price trend is,
however, an important factor affecting the rise of competition, and
the method that takes it into account furnishes the only eco-
nomically sound one for selecting appraisal prices in applying the
cost of reproducing the service theory.
The rate base theory above advanced is a cost theory as truly
as is that of prudent investment despite its development from
income as a starting point. It is such because of the economic
fact that competition tends to drive incomes derived from repro-
ducible factors down to a cost basis. It, therefore, avoids the
objection validly urged against the "fair value" rule that it involves
the "vicious circle" of making the constitutionality of rates turn
on a factor inseparably bound up with rates. 48 This logical fallacy,
though real, is not practically as serious a matter as is frequently
urged since the rules actually developed in ascertaining that "fair
value" have eliminated many of the fallacious results that its
logical application would have involved.49 It is, however, well to
be rid of this erroneous statement of the problem, and the criti-
cisms referred to should hasten that result. The cost of repro-
duction of the service is not one among several factors for deter-
mining the rate base as is cost of reproduction under the eclectic
practice based on the development of Smyth v. Ames. It is ad-
vanced as the sole economically sound principle in the situations in
which it applies, and it applies except in so far as the contribution
of non-reproducible economic goods is necessary in producing the
service. 5° , A conspicuous illustration of the latter is presented by
4
"Robt. L. Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases, 30 Yale
L. Jour. 710.
*'For example, good will and franchise value are disallowed as elements
to be valued, and the very emphasis on cost of reproduction acts as a cor-
rective factor as would the use of any cost basis.
'See concluding paragraph of Justice Brandeis' opinion in the S. W.
Bell Tel. Co. case, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 290, 67 L. Ed. 981, 986, 43 S. C. R.
544, 547. The cost-of-reproducing-the-service method could and would in
practice extend to these non-reproducible elements because these become
assimilated to other capital through the process of capitalization. Their
capitalization is .distinct, however, in being unaffected by economic cost
factors. The method falls short of being a cost theory to that extent. The
same is equally true of the accepted cost-new method, and, in the strictest
economic sense, of prudent investment. The situation is due, in each in-
stance, to the fact that there is a distinction between economic cost and
cost to the particular capitalist or enterpreneur.
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the case of rent legislation.5 1 The theory does not avoid the diffi-
culties that arise in applying the current cost of reproduction
method, nor the necessity for judgments on complicated matters.
It rather raises additional difficulties in that it requires a judgment
on the plant that would be presently constructed to render the
service. The present method is at least constrained within some
practical bounds by the fact that it is ordinarily an existing plant
whose reproduction cost is to be ascertained. It also differs from
prudent investment in the same respect, and also in attaching no
significance to the actual costs of any existing plant. It would
give the same figures as the standard cost of reproduction method.
modified to fix appraisal prices by reference to price trends, only
if static technical conditions are assumed, and as the prudent invest-
ment theory only on the further assumption of a static price
level. It is, with all its recognized defects, a more correct method
for evaluating the forces that give the equivalent of justice under
competition in monopolistic situations and where that process can-
not be effected through a market.
The preceding analysis considered economic factors only, was
intended to indicate the capital base that would tend to fix the capi-
tal cost element in prices under competitive conditions, and was
expressly predicated on the assumption that the purpose of price
regulation was to insure the public the equivalent of competitive
prices. It adopted the narrow and technical conception that those
factors only are economic that reflect general and permanent forces
in the processes of the production and distribution of wealth and
price determination in an economic order based on individual ini-
tiative and competition. The definition was accepted with a full
realization that the organic interrelations of social life prevent any
exact definition of what is, and what is not, economic. It is justi-
fied because it fairly accords with conceptions implicit in the eco-
nomic analysis of both the courts and their critics, and because it
affords a convenient basis for reconsidering the entire problem. It
shows clearly that the adoption of the indicated rate base as the
constitutional measure of price regulation involves certain assump-
tions. The same assumptions underlie the economic considera-
tions urged in support of both the standard cost of reproduction
and prudent investment theories. 52 The issue thus becomes whether
"Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman. (1921) 256 U. S. 170, 65
L. Ed. 877,41 S. C. R. 465; Block v. Hirsch, (1921) 256 U. S. 135,65 L. Ed.
865, 41 S. C. R. 458.
'Donald R. Richberg, A Permanent Basis for Rate Regulation, 31
Yale L. Jour. 263.
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the constitution requires them to be made in dealing with this
problem.
The various constitutional guaranties do not constitute a per-
petual charter for any particular economic order. The constitution
does not impose upon society the standards that would prevail were
competition the sole regulative force of economic activities. There
is frequently a wide disparity between its results and the general
welfare, and many desirable social ends would be sacrificed if that
were the law. The rate base heretofore suggested as that r~quired
by economic analysis would constitute the constitutional measure of
rate regulation only if technical economic factors are its exclusive
determinants and competitive standards fix the limits of price con-
trol. There is no general presumption in favor of any such as-
sumptions, and they are being constantly ignored in taxation and
police power measures that pass the test of judicial review. Losses
incurred in the public operation of street railways may be spread
over the community at large ;. 3 a regulation is valid even though
it deprives one of the competitive advantage involved in a favor-
able location ;54 and the exigencies of war may justify price con-
trol intended to prevent producers from realizing the full benefits
of competition."" The courts in assessing the validity of price
control are not limited to considering economic factors and their
functioning under competitive conditions, but may appraise its
legality by reference to a wider field of social ends. A study of the
rate cases shows that they have in fact done this very thing. An
early case expressly disclaimed any concern with the purely eco-
nomic features of the problem. " That view is. however, untenable
and has never been a serious factor in the judicial approach to
rate questions. Economic considerations are constantly appealed
to in determining the propriety of including particular elements in
valuations "7 and the constitutionally protected rate of return.r8
Non-economic factors have not been without their influence. Legal
logic might justify the view that the extension of the field of price
Boston v. Jackson, (1922) 260 U. S. 309, 67 L. Ed. 274, 43 S. C. R. 129.
"United States v. New 'River Company, (1924) 265 U. S. 533, 44 S.
C. R. 610.68 L. Ed. 660 (Adv. 0.).
'Ford v. United States, (1922) 281 Fed. 298.
'Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., (1901)-183 U. S. 79, 110,
46 L. Ed. 92, 22 S. C. R. 30.
'\Villcox v. Cons. Gas Co., (1909) 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. Ed. 382, 29
S. C. R. 192; Pioneer T. & T. Co. v. Westenhaver, (1911) 29 Okla. 429,
118 Pac. 354.
"'Arkansas Rate Cases, (1911) 187 Fed. 290, 346; Cent. of Ga. R. R.
Co. v. R. R. Comm. of Ala., (1908) 161 Fed. 925, 996.
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control and the adoption of specific rate fixing did no more than
definitize a risk to which certain businesses were always subject,5 '
but the courts could not overlook the fact that a profound change
involving a considerable readjustment of existing economic rela-
tions was in fact being effected. The not unnatural feeling that
the entire burden should not be borne by those who had embarked
their capital in those industries prior to the change is reflected in
the idea that the entire burden of depreciation in values due to
changing price levels should not be borne by investors,6 0 and the
frequent appeals to the obligations of justice.61 The treatment
accorded franchise values in the Consolidated Gas Case2 is based
wholly on the desire not to disappoint entirely the expectations of
investors. These modifying influences have not all reacted in
favor of the producer. The refusal to apply cost-new logically to
permit the capitalization against the public of its own expenditures
in paving over mains,6 3 the hesitancy that has characterized the
treatment of land values,64 the constant reiteration that rates must
be fair to the public as well as the company, and the very inven-
tion of the concept of "fair value" as a substitute for value, evi-
dence a consciousness that the problem involves a balancing of
other interests than the purely economic. Nor can the actual devel-
opment be understood without a recognition of the part played
therein by the individualistic social philosophy that dominated the
period when the problem first arose and solutions were attempted
and that has persisted with somewhat diminished force ever since.65
Considerations of expediency are reflected in fixing the rate of
return by taking into account the necessity for attracting capital. 66
The whole process evidences an attempt to develop a fair and just
basis for reconciling the conflicting claims of different economic
'This argument is advanced by Professor E. C. Goddard, op. cit., at
pp. 793 ft.
'Ames v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., (1894) 64 Fed. 165, 178, 169 U. S.
528, 540.
"Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., (1894) 154 U. S. 362, 410, 38
L. Ed. 1014, 14 S. C. R. 1047.
"*Willcox v. Cons. Gas. Co., (1909) 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. Ed. 382, 29
S. C. R. 192.
'Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, (1915) 238 U. S. 153, 59 L. Ed.
1244, 35 S. C. R. 811.
"Minnesota Rate Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 445 ff., 57 L. Ed. 1511,
33 S. C. R. 729.
'See address of Justice Brewer in Reports of New York State Bar
Association, Vol. 16; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, (1888) 35 Fed. 866,
873; Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., (1901) 183 U. S. 79, 105.
"Arkansas Rate Cases, (1911) 187 Fed. 290. 346; S. W. Bell Tel. Co.
v. P. S. Comm. of Mo., (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 67 L. Ed. 981, 43 S. C. R. 544.
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groups during a transitional period by evaluating their respective
claims by reference to current notions of both justice and the gen-
eral social good. The problem demanded that economic factors be
given some significance, but the courts were right in declining to
accept them as decisive.
The constitutional rate base, therefore, is not necessarily the
capital sum that would tend to fix capital costs under competitive
conditions. The legitimacy of non-economic considerations in its
determination cannot be denied. It cannot, however, be overlooked
that price regulation has thus far been motivated by the desire to
protect the public against economic injury incident to the absence
of effective competition. The fact that, broadly speaking, our
society is still committed to the theory that competitive prices are
fair prices constitutes some measure of fair and reasonable rates
in non-competitive industries. To apply a different standard to the
latter is discrimination in fact which becomes particularly unfair
when given a retroactive effect. The specious justification some-
times alleged that the public is entitled to reasonable rates irre-
spective of their effects upon producers is based on the false as-
sumption that one group in the community is justified in using its
political power to force another group to confer upon it an eco-
nomic advantage. It gains no additional validity merely because
society cari accomplish exactly that result through a judicious use
of its powers to engage in business and taxation. The very fact
that it has those powers at its disposal rather suggests that it resort
to them when it desires to accomplish that result instead of to the
method of forcing an economic loss on those who have embarked
in an enterprise for purposes of economic gain. The theory is
somewhat inconsistent with the principles thus far developed in
defining the power of government to prevent the abandonment of
unprofitable public utility enterprises,67 and those implicit in the
decisions upholding" the federal power to control intrastate rates.68
These indicate a policy that the economic advantages of one group
shall not be acquired at the cost of forcibly imposing economic
disadvantages on other groups in fields where economic motives
predominate. Fixing the prices of public utility services when
'Brooks-Scanlon Company v. R. R. Comm. of La., (1920) 251 U. S.
396, 64 L. Ed. 323, 40 S. C. R. 183; Bullock v. R. R. Comm. of Fla., (1921)
254 U. S. 513, 65 L. Ed. 380, 41 S. C. R. 193.
"Wis. R. R. Comm. v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., (1922) 257 U. S. 563, 66
L. Ed. 371, 42 S. C. R. 232; New York v. United States, (1922) 257 U. S.
591, 66 L. Ed. 385, 42 S. C. R. 239.
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rendered by private capital at points below those that competition
would give will require a more effective justification than is fur-
nished by that theory. It will have to take account of the factors
already referred to and the further fact that the principal interests
involved in price fixing are the economic claims of different groups.
The situation raises two distinct problems. The one involves
the determination of the conditions under which it is reasonable
to apply to public utility enterprises a different standard of eco-
nomic justice than is contemporaneously applied to other busi-
nesses; the other requires the ascertainment of the standard that
shall be applied. The former will be first considered. The con-
stitution does not protect every reasonable expectation against
frustration by governmental action, but the fact that a given change
of law produces that result is one factor in determining its reason-
ableness. The period that preceded legislative price fixing in fact
relied upon competition to protect consumers. Capital invested
during a competitive era reasonably expected an opportunity to
earn at least the returns that competition would permit, and con-
sumers in general were satisfied to rely upon the same force. This
was as true of common carriers as of other businesses. The first
legislative fixing of railroad rates modified the economic-legal situ-
ation no less than did the first extension of price control to eleva-
tors. This fact is not eliminated by a legalistic logic based on
the common law doctrine that the common carrier could charge
only reasonable rates. Any governmental regulation of prices
below coinpetitive standards would defeat the reasonable expecta-
tions of those who had invested before the power of control had
in fact been exercised. -The position of capital thereafter invested
would be somewhat different. It is made at a time when a distinct
classification of capital has been in fact effected on the basis of its
liability to price control. This is fair notice of a difference that
effectually estops claims based solely on the assumption of a right
to equality or similarity of treatment. This fact, and the uncer-
tainty as to the constitutional limits of price control, should have
prevented any reasonable person from entertaining an expectation
that his economic claims were to be measured by the competitive
standards prevailing in other fields. A limitation to lower stand-
ards could scarcely be considered an inequitable interference with
hopes that he had been induced to entertain in reliance xupon public
action or inaction. These considerations do not demand that the
rate base measure shall vary with this time factor. They do, how-
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ever, indicate elements that should be taken into account in reach-
ing a judgment on the comparative merits of competing rate
base theories.
Public control has not only been extended to new fields, but
its character has undergone considerable modification. There are
phases of regulation not immediately involving price control that
have a direct bearing on what would constitute a just standard for
measuring the income public utilities should be permitted to earn.
Prices might reasonably be fixed below competitive levels if the
general scheme of control relieved public service capital of any
risk to which competitive business was subject. This condition is
partly realized in those states that require certificates of conveni-
ence and necessity before persons are permitted to engage in speci-
fied public callings. This factor justifies non-competitive price
standards even as applied to capital invested prior to the assertion
of price control since the protection these provisions afford extend
to it. It is not unreasonable for the public to demand a price for
that advantage. If regulation is so adjusted as to protect public
utility capital against sudden depreciation due to unforeseeable and
incalculable technical advances, it would be reasonable to eliminate
the chances of gain from forces that frequently give particular
capital differential returns in a competitive system. The same is
true if it is relieved of any risks incident to all business enterprise.
There are other conditions that should have an opposite effect.
Fairness requires that investments made under public compulsion
be accorded more favorable treatment than those voluntarily made.
Such capital may reasonably demand that it be relieved not only of
the risks incident to competition but also those inevitable in any
business venture.
There are, therefore, numerous factors to be weighed in deter-
mining the reasonableness of applying non-competitive price stand-
ards to public service rates. The early stages in the development
of the constitutional limits of price control reflect the confusion
of a transition period when the lines along which adjustments
should be made are but vaguely perceived. The principles worked
out during that period tend to persist even though the terms of the
problem have changed. There was considerable justice in applying
conceptions of fairness shaped under the influences of an indi-
vidualistic and competitive society to capital that had in fact been
invested while those theories prevailed. There is no need to con-
tinue to apply them to capital invested under radically different
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conditions. It is perhaps impossible to determine at this date how
much of existing public utility capital was invested during the
period when laissez-faire was the policy in that field. It is certain
that a considerable part of it was invested during the period of
regulation. Considerations of convenience prevent differences in
their treatment. The existing uncertainty and confusion have re-
sulted in no small part from retaining in the field of public utili-
ties conceptions of economic justice based on the assumptions of
a competitive economic order. It should frankly be recognized that
public utility capital today constitutes a distinct class of property,
and that existing conditions require and justify abandoning the
attempt to define its economic claims by reference to competitive
standards. This demands no more than an express recognition of
practices implicit in the actual treatment courts have accorded the
problem. Its conscious adoption as an assumption in evolving a
reasonable substitute standard is essential if a rational technique
is to be devised for adequately dealing with a complex question.
It may safely be premised that public utility property should
be accorded reasonable treatment. Such a statement is, however, as
inadequate as the formula of Smyth v. Ames. The issue is the
tests. that shall determine what is reasonable, and these can be
developed only by reference to the significant elements in the situa-
tion. The present movement of price regulation began as, and
continues to be, a substitute for either competition or public owner-
ship and operation. It continues today to function in a society
committed in general to a theory that economic activity should be
left to individual initiative regulated by competition. It is an
attempt .both to secure the assumed benefits of these forces and
relieve the community of the risks that it itself would have to
assume under public ownership and operation. An attempt to
predict how long the public will continue to prefer private initia-
tive in these fields would be futile. There is as yet no broad move-
ment away from it. The growth of population is certain to require
a progressive expansion of public utility enterprises demanding
new capital. Considerations of expediency alone, therefore, sug-
gest a policy that will encourage continued investment in these
fields. There will have to be compensating advantages for the
limitations and restrictions imposed lest the disparity of treatment
cause the diversion of new capital into competitive businesses.
The possible compensations are comparatively limited in number.
The most feasible and reasonable method is to redistribute the
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various risks involved in business enterprise. The reasonable
standard should be so fixed that the disadvantages imposed on pub-
lic utility capital in limiting its income below competitive levels
are offset by compensating advantages relieving it of some of the
risks to which ordinary capital is subjected. Such a course would
be not only expedient but fair and just.
Ordinary capital is subject to a variety of risks. There is
first of all the competition of other capital rendering identical
services. There is also the competition of substitute services. The
growth of bus lines has seriously affected railroad traffic in several
states, including Minnesota. There is always the possibility that
changed conditions may practically wipe out the demand for the
product. -The eighteenth amendment reduced a considerable capital
to junk. Technical advances may lessen the cost of producing the
service, make possible an improved service at the same cost, or
cheapen the cost of capital goods so that a smaller capital outlay
is required to produce the same service. Counsel for the public in
Smyth v. Ames sought to force the railroads to bear the risks of
a falling price level. Each of these risks has as its counterpart
the possibility of an advantage to the public. It is in part for bear-
ing these risks that capital demands and secures compensation. It
has elsewhere been shown that there are certain risks borne by
the public from which not even competition can relieve it, and
that these have as their counterpart the possibility of advantages
to certain capital. The most striking recent example is that afforded
by the rapidly rising price levels of the war and post-war period.
This complex of risks and countervailing advantages furnishes the
raw material out of which may be fashioned a reasonable adjust-
ment between the conflicting claims of the public and investors in
public utility enterprises. There is nothing in the past conduct of
either group warranting a hope that they will be governed by any-
thing except their own immediate advantage. The era of rising
prices that began shortly after Sinyth v. Anzes has caused the rather
suggestive situation that each is now contending for what the
other then stood." The matter is one that the court will have to
settle.
The real issue between the public and the utilities concerns
the principles that shall determine the income the latter are to
receive. The theory just advanced would not result in uniform
'See arguments of counsel in Smyth v. Ames, (1897) 169 U. S. 466,
42 L. Ed. 819, 18 S. C. R. 418.
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principles in the entire field. There would be differences to reflect
differences in the distribution of these various risks because the
policy of regulation was not the same in all cases. The measure
of fair treatment is not the same for a water company with an
exclusive franchise of definite duration as it would be for a rail-
road company subject to the unlimited competition of bus lines.
The position of utilities with practically protected monopolies is
not to be compared with that of the railroads even when these
have the partial protection against competition by substitute serv-
ices that the requirement of certificates of convenience and neces-
sity affords. The former is insured an exclusive opportunity to
realize the benefits of an increasing market; the latter is guaran-
teed no such opportunity. The principles for fixing a fair income
for public utility capital could be either mediated through the rate
of return or reflected in the rate base. The former permits of
greater flexibility and should, therefore, take care of factors sus-
ceptible of direct modification by regulation. The latter need re-
flect only those risks relatively independent of direct authoritative
control. The principal one of this character from the point of
view of capital is lowered production cost, and as far as it affects
the public increased production cost, whether due to technical fac-
tors or changes in the value of money. The same considerations
require the rate base to reflect only those countervailing advan-
tages that are inevitably linked with those types of risk.
The question, therefore, is whether it is just and expedient
to state the rate base in terms that shall both relieve the utilities
and public of the risks, and deprive them of the advantages, inci-
dent to changing costs. The contest between them since Snyth
v. Ames has been waged around that point. The emphasis on the
necessity for considering present prices constitutes a recognition
of the claim of the utilities to at least a part of advantages due to
rising prices, while the insistence upon applying reproduction cost
to the actual plant at the same time prevents the public from
realizing the benefits of technical improvements in the process of
rendering the service. This inequality is not offset by the possi-
bility of public advantage if prices decrease because of the indi-
cated effects of applying them to the actual plant. The reproduc-
tion-cost method as ordinarily applied is for this reason unfair to
the public. Would investment furnish a more equitable give and
take? It would relieve both of the risks incident to changes in
the price level, but would be no more effective than the other
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method for securing the public the benefits of improvements in the
art. The former would, however, permit the capitalization against
the public of price increments in the case of capital goods that rep-
resent a stage of technical efficiency less than the public would
tend to get under competition for which the possibility of a capital
decrement in respect of the same capital goods is scarcely an
equivalent. Investment effects a somewhat more equitable com-
promise of the mutual risks and advantages than does cost-new.
Its adoption even in the qualified form of "prudent investment"
would conduce to certainty of income which most investors would
willingly pay for by the sacrifice of contingent gains procurable only
in exchange for possible losses. This factor constitutes one of the
principal reasons urged by Justice Brandeis in support of his
theory. 0 The other- is the necessity of adopting a rate base that
eliminates the opportunity for wild guessing if regulation is to
become a policy affording any hope of success and avoiding the
waste involved in its present administration. A member of the
Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission was recently
reported to have interpreted the trend of judicial decisions on valu-
ation matters as an argument for curbing expenditures before
regulatory bodies because their function is only preliminary to rate
making which is finally performed by the courts.71 It would be
useless to add anything to what Justice Brandeis has said on these
phases of the question. His position on them is in every respect
sound.
The general superiority of the investment theory does not
involve any claim of perfection for it. It is bound to produce dis-
crepanties between the actual income utilities would be entitled to
earn and the contemporaneous competitive standards that may
appear very unjust in an era of rapidly rising prices if that in-
crease is due to causes that could not reasonably have been fore-
seen?. 2  Its application under such circumstances can be justified
only because it affords utilities a compensating protection against
rapid price decreases. The balancing of these disadvantages and
advantages will probably be a rather approximate one, but it is
doubtful whether a permanent policy can take account of such
"S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. P. S. C. of Mo., (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 302 if,
67 L. Ed. 981, 43 S. C. R. 544.
"Minneapolis Journal, Dec. 30, 1924. p. 1.
"
2See Cons. Gas. Co. v. Newton, (1920) 267-Fed. 231, 236; H. B. Brown,
The Defects in Mr. Justice Brandeis' Theory of Prudent Investment as a
Rate Base, 12 Calif. L. Rev. 283.
VALUATION IN RATE CASES
extraordinary factors. Gradual price changes that show perma-
nence can be adequately provided for by permitting the policy as
to replacements to take them into account. The application of the
theory to the case of donated property raises a much more difficult
question. The classic example is furnished by the railway land
grants. These donations were in fact made as a quid pro quo for
undertaking ventures deemed of public importance and for the
public benefit at a time when the government did not itself wish
to do so. The equity thus raised should be considered, and the
theory might reasonably be modified in this respect despite the
difficulties of defining the extent of the modification. This seems
fair despite the argument that can be made that such donations
make the public a co-entrepreneur entitled in perpetuity to a return
in the form of lower rates by the measure of that item of capital
cost. There is one other consideration that should at least be sug-
gested. The present trend of regulation is to limit the right to with-
draw from the public service. If the limits on that power are to be
defined in terms of confiscation, and the existence of confiscation
is to be determined by reference to investment, public utility capital
is effectively prevented from shifting to more profitable fields.
This, coupled with the power to compel further extensions, may
at times inflict a serious disadvantage for which there is no com-
pensating advantage yet offered in the field of regulation. The
desirability of definiteness and certainty in the rate base suggests
that this be cared for through a theory of capital charges.
The preceding discussion must have made it apparent that
the fair and reasonable measure of public utility incomes is a func-
tion of both the rate base and the rate of return. Certain risks
and elements have been indicated that cannot conveniently be
reflected in the rate base consistently with the reasonable demand
for definiteness and certainty therein. The principles that are to
determine the rate of return will accordingly have to be adjusted to
those adopted for measuring the rate base. This interdependence
is clearly recognized in the opinion of Justice Brandeis in the
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company Case in so far as capital
raised by borrowing is concerned. The capital charge on borrowed
capital is to be the rate contracted for for at least the duration of
the loan if reasonable, financial judgment has been used in placing
it.73 This aspect of his theory has failed to receive the attention
"
2S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. P. S. C. of Mo., (1922) 262 U. S. 276, 302 ff.,
67 L. Ed. 981, 43 S. C. R. 544.
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it deserves. It is the complement to prudent investment that gives
his theory in its entirety the character of a justly balanced and
co-ordinated whole. It is a phase that is not likely to appeal
strongly to partisan advocates of the public interest at all costs.
It is unfortunate that his opinion contains no indication of how
the rate of return is to be fixed on capital raised by the sale of
stock or derived from the reinvestment of earnings. A distinc-
tion might reasonably be made in this matter depending on whether
the investment was made voluntarily or under public compulsion.
It does not seem unreasonable to apply to the former the prevail-
ing market rate for public utility capital at the time the question
arises. If resort is had to the rate in non-public utility fields the
rate adopted should reflect both the difference in security and the
disadvantage to which public utility capital is subject through re-
strictions on its right to withdraw which assimilates its status some-
what to capital invested under compulsion. The position of new in-
vestments made under compulsion is somewhat different. It would
seem reasonable to permit the rate prevailing at the time the invest-
ment is made to apply for a reasonable period thereafter whatever
the trend of the rate during that period. It is recognized that,
if the original rate is fixed at the then prevailing market rate, an
advantage is' conferred upon such capital and its security enhanced.
These are, however, obtained by sacrificing the possible gains from
increasing rates. This proposed adjustment is reasonable consid-
ering the circumstances under which such capital is invested. It
is even fairer as applied to the reinvestment of earnings, particu-
larly when that method is the only practicable one available. The
case then bears a close resemblance to forced loans by the stock-
holder, and the principles of capital cost developed by Justice Bran-
deis for borrowed capital may reasonably be applied.
There are certain phases of regulation affecting income that
should be mentioned. The public may conceivably compel improve-
ments involving a considerable scrapping of existing plant. The
mutual equities thus affected might be adjusted through the rate
of return, but a more certain technique would be desirable. The
purpose of such regulations is to secure for the public the benefits
of technical advances. Although this is a risk which under com-
petition would be borne by the producer, the consumer would tend
to pay for it. There is no reason why the public should not bear
the cost in the case of public utilities. The investment in the
VALUATION IN RATE CASES
scrapped plant should be amortized during the succeeding
years. 7
The problem of the rate base cannot, therefore, be dissociated
from that of the rate of return and others incident to regulation.
Prudent investment furnishes on the whole the most satisfactory
answer to what experience has proved the most difficult of the
problems price regulation has raised. It is, however, a mistake to
defend it without a recognition of its implications for evolving
reasonable principles for other phases of regulation. All these
constitute the complementary parts of a single and unified scheme
of control, and the governing principles of each should reflect that
fact. It is beyond the purview of the present article to indicate
in what items of detail existing rules will require modification.
It is sufficient to state that the adoption of prudent investment
furnishes the basis on which it should be done and new principles
evolved as regulation develops. It is not quite exact, however,
that the theory gives a rate base that "would be ascertained as
a fact, not determined as matter of opinion. '7 5 .The determination
of whether an investment is prudent or imprudent may in many
cases involve judgment and opinion.76  Fixing the capital costs to
be allowed on borrowed capital requires an appraisement of meth-
ods and terms of financing necessarily leaving a considerable
scope for opinion. The justification of Justice Brandeis' theory
is not that it has eliminated the necessity for judgment and opin-
ion, but that it has reduced the opportunity therefor. There are
questions that have arisen in rate-fixing whose answers are in no
way facilitated by the adoption of prudent investment. It will
still be as difficult as ev er to determine when a particular class
of traffic should pay its own way and when it has done so. 77 The
constitutional limits of rate control have not been completely
definitized, but prudent investment would give greater certainty
than hitherto obtainable. Caution must be observed lest a new
"illusion of certainty" obstruct the intelligent formulation of fur-
"
4See in this connection Kansas City. So. Ry. Co. v. United States,(1913) 231 U. S. 423, 451, 58 L. Ed. 296, 34 S. C. R. 125. Such treatment
has been applied to operating deficits resulting from rates prescribed by
the public; Louisiana Water Co. v. Public Service Commission of Mo.,(1923) 294 Fed. 954.
"S. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. P. S. C. of Mo., (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 306,
67 L. Ed. 981, 43 S. C. R. 544.
"For Justice Brandeis' definition of "prudent investment" see footnote
1 to his opinion in the S. W. Bell Tel. Co. case, (1923) 262 U. S. 276, 67
L. Ed. 981, 43 S. C. R. 544.
"See cases cited in footnote (32).
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ther principles for meeting the constitutional issues involved in
price fixing.
The preceding discussion has frankly appealed to considera-
tions of expediency and policy. This is unavoidable in dealing with
this type of constitutional issue. Objections to price-fixing have
largely centered about the due process clause. There are legislative
acts, in all respects' formally correct, that are yet not due process
of law. It is impossible to ascertain what legislative acts are not
such unless the due process clause be given an intelligent construc-
tion. It acquires concrete meaning only if considered as a general-
ized statement of a broad policy. It does, despite opposite views
sometimes entertained, give individualism a certafn measure of
constitutional protection. It does not, however, confer an eternal
lease of life on any of its particular historical expressions, not
interpose a complete bar to the realization of other ends. It invites
an evaluation of competing and conflicting ends, and this is impos-
sible without resort to considerations of policy. If any further
justification is required, it is found in the practice of the courts
in dealing with this very problem.78
A brief recapitulation is necessary. Our society is in general
committed to the theory of competition as the regulative agency
of economic activities, and individual initiative as its motive force.
These function in a legal order whose conceptions of property and
contract are molded by their influence. Authoritative price fixing,
and our present schemes of regulation, have in substance effected
so distinct a classification of economic capital that competitive
standards of economic justice have become inadequate for measur-
ing it in the case of public utility property. Practical considera-
tions alone demand a fair substitute evolved by a process of give
and take. The problem is to develop principles for determining
the income which public utilities shall be afforded an opportunity
to earn. This can proceed rationally only by taking account of
the different elements of the problem and their interrelations. The
factor that has received most extensive judicial consideration is
the rate base. Three decades of litigation have produced only un-
certainty and confusion from which the prudent investment theory
offers a partial escape. Its adoption should be accompanied by the
acceptance of the prudent capital cost theory, and may entail a read-
justment of principles affecting other problems of regulation. It
is by no means a solution of the entire problem, but represents
7BSee pp. 226 ff.
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a fair basis for evolving a set of principles that should put the
matter in a more satisfactory condition than that thus far at-
tained.7 9
"'For views either favoring reproduction cost, or opposed to prudent
investment, see Frederic G. Dorety, The Function of Reproduction Cost in
Public Utility Valuation and Rate Making, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 173; H. B.
Brown, op. cit.; Leslie Craven, Railroad Valuation: A Statement of the
Problem, 9 Am. Bar Association Jour. 681. For a suggestion as to the
inapplicability of prudent investment in certain businesses, see Nathan
Matthews, The Effect of the Recent Decisions of the Supreme Court on
Reproduction Cost as a Test of Value, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 431.
